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THE CHALLENGE OF SUPREME COURT 
BIOGRAPHY: THE CASE OF CHIEF 
JUSTICE REHNQUIST 
THE PARTISAN: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 
REHNQUIST. By John A. Jenkins.1 New York, N.Y.: 
PublicAffairs. 2012. Pp. xxi + 330. $28.99 (cloth). 
Christopher W. Schmidt2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Partisan, a new biography of Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist by John A. Jenkins, is a bad book. But it is a bad book 
that is worth engaging because it provides important information 
about its unquestionably important subject.3 It is also worth 
engaging because its shortcomings, while pronounced, even 
egregious, in fact derive from challenges inherent in the enterprise 
of Supreme Court biography. 
I pursue three goals in this review. First, I identify what is 
useful in The Partisan: information, some new, some helpful 
elaborations of what was already known, which helps us better 
understand Chief Justice Rehnquist, the private man and the 
 1. Founder & CEO of Law Street Media and President & Publisher Emeritus of CQ Press. 
 2. Assistant Professor, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law; Faculty Fellow, American Bar 
Foundation. 
 3. THE PARTISAN is the first book-length biography of Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
There have been numerous books on the Supreme Court under Rehnquist’s leadership. 
See, e.g., HERMAN SCHWARTZ, THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE 
RIGHT (2002); JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE 
THE REHNQUIST COURT (1995); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET 
WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT (2007); MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE 
REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2005). There have 
been books on Rehnquist’s jurisprudence. See, e.g., SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (1989); THE REHNQUIST LEGACY (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2006). And 
there have been countless law review articles about Rehnquist’s work on the Court. See, 
e.g., 58 STAN. L. REV. 1661 (“Symposium: Looking Backward, Looking Forward: The 
Legacy of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor”). Prior to THE PARTISAN, the 
only book-length biographical study of Rehnquist was a celebratory “portrait” written by 
one of Rehnquist’s close friends. HERMAN J. OBERMAYER, REHNQUIST: A PERSONAL 
PORTRAIT OF THE DISTINGUISHED CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES (2009). 
271 
 
7 - THE CHALLENGE OF SUPREME COURT BIOS_SCHMIDT (DO NOT DELETE) 4/2/2014 11:04 AM 
272 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 29:271 
public jurist. Second, I examine what Jenkins is trying to do in this 
book and where he runs into problems. The most obvious flaw of 
this biography is its relentless tendentiousness. The author clearly 
dislikes Rehnquist, and he uses the biography as a vehicle for an 
extended, largely unpersuasive, ad hominem attack on his subject. 
But Jenkins’ goal is not merely to criticize Rehnquist the jurist. It 
is to “unmask” (p. xix) Rehnquist, to conflate his personality and 
his judicial views and thereby reveal the core of the man. Jenkins, 
predictably, finds what he was looking for: a harsh, uncaring, and 
deeply conservative ideologue. But in the process he presents a 
version of Rehnquist that not only fails to align with certain 
known facts about the man, but also lacks the complex humanity 
of a fully drawn biographical subject. Finally, I argue that the 
problems that this particular book puts in high relief are in fact 
symptomatic of the genre of Supreme Court biography. My 
critique thus provides a platform to consider the unique obstacles 
faced by any biographer of a Supreme Court Justice. 
II. WHAT WE LEARN ABOUT REHNQUIST 
A. REHNQUIST AND THE CHALLENGE OF BIOGRAPHY 
The life of any public figure might be divided into three 
categories. There is the public life. For a Supreme Court Justice 
this would include written opinions, public statements, 
information about relations with other Justices, and the like. 
There is the private life. This would include biographical 
information about the Justice’s upbringing and education, 
relations with family and friends, activities and interests beyond 
the Court. And then there is the personal. This would include 
some difficult-to-define combination of personality, character, 
and self-identity. For the biographer, it is the reconstruction of 
this last, interior layer, what Judge Richard Posner has labeled the 
“essential self,”4 that pulls together, and gives meaning to, the 
various strands of the subject’s life. 
The measure of a great biography is its ability to present a 
compelling portrait of the subject, one in which public, private, 
and personal align into a singular, comprehensible identity—but 
one that is not so reduced that it loses the complexities and texture 
of the human being at the center of the study. The explanatory 
force of a biography lies in its ability to allow each of the three 
 4. Richard A. Posner, Judicial Biography, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 502, 504 (1995).  
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realms of the subject’s life to bring insight to the others. This is 
where the unique value of a biographical approach to law is 
located: The biographer reshapes our understanding of the 
subject’s public life in light of those elements of the subject’s life 
that are less well known. 
These considerations highlight why Rehnquist is a 
particularly difficult subject for the biographer. He insistently, 
even belligerently, resisted introspection. Rehnquist was a prolific 
author throughout his time on the Court, writing about a wide 
variety of topics, including the Court’s history5 and the challenges 
of judging and constitutional interpretation.6 At one point he even 
drafted a novel about a judge and his clerk that clearly drew on 
his own experiences. But he recoiled at the idea of writing directly 
about himself. To write an “interesting” memoir, he explained in 
2001, “you have to say that ‘this is a good person,’ ‘that’s a bad 
person,’ ‘that’s a medium person,’ ‘he really let me down here.’ 
And I just don’t want to do that.”7 Rehnquist simply did not like 
talking about himself, friends explained.8 His autobiographical 
opening to his book on the Supreme Court is self-conscious and 
stilted.9 He rarely gave interviews, and when he did he generally 
avoided saying anything particularly interesting about either 
himself or his approach to judging. Judge Posner once described 
the “general challenge of judicial biography” as figuring out how 
to “write empathetically and arrestingly about dullish people who 
are not introspective.”10 Whether or not this is a fair assessment 
of the judicial profession, Chief Justice Rehnquist did little to 
undermine Judge Posner’s observation. 
So perhaps it is not surprising that Jenkins found relatively 
little in his research on Rehnquist to reveal any sort of inner, 
personal world. This was a man who simply did not seem 
interested in exploring this terrain. Or if he did, he was not about 
to reveal his findings anywhere that a biographer might find them. 
The journals Rehnquist kept as a college and law student were 
filled with irreverent commentary about his studies, humorous 
sketches, and prosaic details of his travels, but not much revealing 
information beyond this (pp. 17, 23). When, later in life, he added 
 5. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT (rev. ed. 2002). 
 6. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. 
L. REV. 693 (1976). 
 7. Charles Lane, Head of the Class, STAN. MAG. (July/Aug. 2005) (quoting 2001 
Charlie Rose interview). 
 8. Id. 
 9. REHNQUIST, supra note 5, at 3–20. 
 10. Posner, supra note 4, at 516.  
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occasional entries to these journals, they consisted mostly of 
quotations from history books and biographies he was reading 
(pp. 79–80). Those insights we get into the personal side of 
Rehnquist in The Partisan are largely from the outside, and 
usually from a distance. 
Jenkins is similarly unsuccessful at shedding new light on 
Rehnquist’s public side. As I discuss in more detail below,11 when 
it comes to legal issues Jenkins is an unreliable, under-informed, 
and thoroughly biased guide. There is little of value in his 
scattershot and cursory engagement with Rehnquist’s legal 
thought and doctrinal contributions. 
What contributions there are in The Partisan, then, consist 
largely of Jenkins’ exploration into two areas of Rehnquist’s life 
story that fall within the aforementioned category of the 
“private.” Jenkins offers much information about Rehnquist’s 
work and political activities prior to becoming a Justice.12 Here we 
find a smart, curious, and often irreverent young man dedicated 
from his early years to a confident, doctrinaire, libertarian-
inflected conservatism. It was this combative conservatism that 
would attract the attention of the Nixon Administration, setting 
in motion his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1972. The 
other area of Rehnquist’s life for which Jenkins provides new 
insight is his extracurricular activities during his time on the 
bench. Although a notably constant man in many ways, there was 
a restless quality to Rehnquist’s mind, one that expressed itself in 
his constant search for new challenges and diversions. As a justice 
he cultivated a variety of outside interests, never allowing the 
work of the Court to dominate his life. 
B. THE PRE-COURT YEARS 
1. Upbringing and Education 
Jenkins, like others before him, identifies the roots of 
Rehnquist’s conservative political and legal commitments in his 
family and the community in which he was raised.13 Born in 1924, 
Rehnquist grew up in Shorewood, Wisconsin, a suburb of 
Milwaukee on the shores of Lake Michigan. His political leanings 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. Jenkins dedicates approximately half of this relatively short biography (the text 
comes in at just over 250 pages) to Rehnquist’s pre-Court years. 
 13. See, e.g., George Lardner Jr. & Saundra Saperstein, A Chief Justice-Designate 
With Big Ambitions, WASH. POST, July 6, 1986, at A1.  
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formed early. He was raised in an anti-New Deal Republican 
family in a community that was, even at the height of the New 
Deal, staunchly Republican.14 The town was all-white, its 
inhabitants accepting of a casual, seemingly unchallenged racial 
insensitivity (during his time as a student, Rehnquist’s high school 
held a Harlem-themed prom) (p. 3). 
The subsequent steps in his life reflected the characteristics 
that were coming to define Rehnquist: he was bright and 
confident as a student; he was impatient; he could be irreverent; 
and he was politically conservative. Rehnquist received a 
scholarship to Kenyon College in Ohio. After a semester at 
Kenyon, he enlisted in the Army. Toward the end of the war, he 
shipped out to North Africa, where he served as a weather 
observer for the Army Air Corps. After his return to the United 
States in early 1946, Rehnquist attended Stanford University, 
supported by the G.I. Bill and various part-time jobs (p. 13). He 
graduated in just two years with both bachelor’s and master’s 
degrees in political science. After a brief, disappointing stint as a 
graduate student in the Government Department at Harvard, he 
abandoned his thoughts of becoming an academic and returned to 
Stanford for law school. Jenkins brings together scattered 
evidence of the sharpening conservative commitments of the 
young Rehnquist: while serving in North Africa, Rehnquist was 
impressed by Friedrich von Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, the 
recently published free-market manifesto (p. 14);15 his Stanford 
master’s thesis articulated a narrow, libertarian-styled vision of 
individual rights (p. 22);16 his disillusionment with Harvard 
stemmed at least partly from his professors’ liberal leanings (pp. 
24–25). During his time at Stanford Law School, he was, according 
to one profile, “widely regarded as both outlandishly conservative 
and outlandishly bright.”17 At Stanford, Rehnquist was editor-in-
chief of the Law Review and graduated a semester early (p. 26). 
2. Supreme Court Clerkship 
While we have only scattered writings and recollections to 
reconstruct Rehnquist’s nascent political and legal attitudes up to 
 14. Id. 
 15. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
 16. William Hibbs Rehnquist, Contemporary Theories of Rights, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1997 (2006) (reprint of Rehnquist’s 1948 master’s thesis). For a laudatory analysis of 
Rehnquist’s thesis, see Douglas W. Kmiec, Young Mr. Rehnquist’s Theory of Moral 
Rights—Mostly Observed, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1827 (2006). 
 17. Lane, supra note 7.   
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this point, the paper trail becomes far more revealing during the 
next stage of Rehnquist’s life, when he clerked for U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Robert H. Jackson. Rehnquist’s memorandums for 
Justice Jackson, which came to public attention during his 
confirmation hearings to the Supreme Court in 1971,18 have been 
thoroughly examined by scholars.19 The most famous was one in 
which the clerk confidently weighed in on the merits of the 
pending Brown v. Board of Education. Titled “A Random 
Thought on the Segregation Cases,” Rehnquist urged the Court 
not to involve itself in the school segregation issue, a position he 
located within a broader skepticism toward the judicial defense of 
individual rights against state regulation. “[I]t was not part of the 
judicial function to thwart public opinion except in extreme 
cases,”20 he wrote. State racial segregation policy “quite clearly is 
not one of those extreme cases which commands 
intervention . . . .”21 He concluded: “I realize that it is an 
unpopular and unhumanitarian position, for which I have been 
excoriated by ‘liberal’ colleagyes [sic], but I think Plessy v. 
Ferguson was right and should be re-affirmed.”22 
Rehnquist further elaborated on his views in memos 
involving a case of racial exclusion from party primaries.23 Again, 
he portrayed himself as a voice of reason—“a lawyer, rather than 
a crusader”—standing up against a crowd of liberals engaged in a 
 18. See, e.g., John P. MacKenzie, Controversy Deepens over Rehnquist Memo, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 10, 1971, at A1. 
 19. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 304-09 (2004); RICHARD KLUGER, 
SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK 
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 604-09 (1976); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH 
OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1941-1953, at 
696-703 (2006); Saul Brenner, The Memos of Supreme Court Law Clerk William Rehnquist: 
Conservative Tracts, or Mirrors of His Justice’s Mind?, 76 JUDICATURE 77 (1993); Laura 
K. Ray, A Law Clerk and His Justice: What William Rehnquist Did Not Learn from Robert 
Jackson, 29 IND. L. REV. 535, 553-59 (1996); Bernard Schwartz, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
Justice Jackson and the Brown Case, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 245–47; Brad Snyder & John 
Q. Barrett, Rehnquist’s Missing Letter: A Former Law Clerk’s 1955 Thoughts on Justice 
Jackson and Brown, 53 B.C. L. REV. 631 (2012); Brad Snyder, What Would Justice Holmes 
Do (WWJHD)?: Rehnquist’s Plessy Memo, Majoritarianism, and Parents Involved, 69 
OHIO ST. L.J. 873, 873–76 (2008).  
 20. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist to Justice Robert H. Jackson, “A 
Random Thought on the Segregation Cases” (undated), Robert Houghwout Jackson 
Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division [hereinafter Jackson Papers], Box 184, 
Folder 5, reprinted in Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist: Hearings Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 314 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 Nomination 
Hearings]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 315. 
 23. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).  
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“pathological search for discrimination.”24 His reasoning here 
moved beyond the posture of the neutral, post-Lochner 
constitutional lawyer dedicated to judicial deference except in 
“extreme” cases. He adopted a more substantive—and frankly 
conservative—vision of race relations: 
It is about time the Court faced the fact that the white people 
on [sic] the South don’t like the colored people; the 
Constitution restrains them from effecting this dislike through 
state action, but it most assuredly did not appoint the Court as 
a sociological watchdog to rear up every time private 
discrimination raises its admittedly ugly head. 
He emphasized the costs civil rights imposed on other 
constitutional values, namely “freedom of association” and 
“majority rule.”25 
Jenkins follows in the long line of scholars who have 
concluded that Rehnquist’s later attempts to disown the contents 
of these writings were disingenuous: at the time he wrote the 
memos, Rehnquist clearly subscribed to the positions he outlined. 
The evidence is simply overwhelming.26 Jenkins supplements the 
language from Rehnquist’s memos with a letter Rehnquist wrote 
to Justice Frankfurter soon after Jackson’s death in October 1954, 
in which he expressed his disappointment with Jackson—a 
disappointment likely connected to Jackson’s refusal to follow 
Rehnquist’s advice on the civil rights cases.27 Jenkins also 
references Rehnquist’s admission during his 1984 interview with 
the Justice that, with regard to Brown, “there was a perfectly 
reasonable argument the other way” (p. 43).28 
3. Phoenix 
Jenkins provides some helpful information about the next 
stage of Rehnquist’s life as well. In the summer of 1953, Rehnquist 
left Washington, D.C., for Phoenix (chosen for the weather, he 
often explained) to practice law. He married Natalie “Nan” 
 24. Cert. memo from William Rehnquist to Justice Robert Jackson on Terry v. 
Adams (undated), Jackson Papers, Box 179, Folder 9, reprinted in 1986 Nomination 
Hearings, supra note 20, at 312. 
 25. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Regarding the Opinions of Justices 
Black and Frankfurter in Terry v. Adams, Jackson Papers, Box 179, Folder 9, reprinted in 
1986 Nomination Hearings, supra note 20, at 313. 
 26. See texts cited, supra note 19. 
 27. See Snyder & Barrett, supra note 19.  
 28. John A. Jenkins, The Partisan: A Talk with Justice Rehnquist, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Mar. 3, 1985, at 28, 30.  
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Cornell, whom he had met while in law school, and settled into 
law practice and family life. He and Nan raised a son and two 
daughters. He ventured into political activity, mostly on the local 
level. 
As extensively documented in the record collected years later 
for his 1971 nomination to the Supreme Court, Rehnquist’s 
speeches and activities during this period were starkly and 
aggressively conservative and libertarian. He attacked the 
Supreme Court for its liberal leanings, which he blamed in part on 
the influence of liberal law clerks.29 And he stood opposed to civil 
rights reform—a position that, along with his memorandum on 
Brown, would become a focal point in his confirmation hearings. 
We see in these statements a further elaboration of 
Rehnquist the sociologist of race, stepping outside the legalist 
shield of deference to majoritarian outcomes and formal 
procedures to offer his own, quite pessimistic account of the 
nature of race relations in America. In 1964, Rehnquist publicly 
opposed a Phoenix ordinance that would prohibit restaurants and 
other public accommodations from discriminating based on race, 
declaring it an affront to private property rights. Rehnquist’s 
libertarian commitments were well on display in his testimony 
before the city council when he declared that people came to 
Arizona because of their commitment to “[f]ree enterprise, and 
by that I mean not just free enterprise in the sense of the right to 
make a buck but the right to manage your own affairs as free as 
possible from the interference of government.”30 Rehnquist also 
grounded his opposition to civil rights policy on a skepticism 
toward the capacity of law to uproot the deeply entrenched racial 
prejudice he saw coursing through social relations. As he wrote in 
a letter to his local newspaper, civil rights law is “[u]nable to 
correct the source of the indignity to the Negro,” which was “the 
state of mind of the proprietor who refuses to treat each potential 
customer on his own merits.”31 
He applied similar libertarian reasoning to school 
desegregation policy. In a letter to the editor of the Arizona 
 29. See also William H. Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1957, at 74. 
 30. Comments of William Rehnquist, Made June 15, 1964, at the Public Hearing on 
the Public Accommodations Ordinance Proposed for the City of Phoenix, reprinted in 
Nominations of Justice William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 305 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 Nomination Hearings]. 
 31. William H. Rehnquist, Public Accommodations Law Passage is Called “Mistake,” 
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, reprinted in 1971 Nomination Hearings, supra note 30, at 307.  
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Republic, written in the midst of a 1967 debate over a school 
desegregation plan, Rehnquist challenged the Phoenix school 
superintendent for declaring “achieving an integrated society” his 
guiding goal in framing school assignment policy.32 “[W]e are no 
more dedicated to an ‘integrated’ society than we are to a 
‘segregated’ society,” Rehnquist wrote; “we are instead dedicated 
to a free society, in which each man is equal before the law, but in 
which each man is accorded a maximum amount of freedom of 
choice in his individual activities.”33 
During his pre-Court years, Rehnquist staked out political 
and legal positions on the far right end of the ideological 
spectrum. By the late 1960s, his positions on race were being 
pushed beyond the pale of politically acceptable opinion. This fact 
would almost derail his appointment to the Supreme Court. 
4. In the Nixon Administration 
Rehnquist’s legal and political activities brought with them 
connections that would eventually return him to Washington. 
When Barry Goldwater, the United States Senator from Arizona, 
ran for President in 1964, Rehnquist served as a speechwriter and 
advisor (pp. 73–74).34 Rehnquist became close to Richard 
Kleindienst, a lawyer with extensive connections in Arizona 
Republican politics who was appointed deputy attorney general in 
the Nixon Administration. He, in turn, got Rehnquist appointed to 
run the Office of Legal Counsel (p. 77). In early 1969, the forty-
four-year-old Rehnquist was back in the nation’s capital. 
Rehnquist spoke out, in public and behind closed doors, 
aggressively advancing his political and legal commitments—
which aligned well with the right wing of the Nixon 
Administration. He was a law-and-order advocate through and 
through. He warned of the “barbarians of the new left,” who 
“constitute[] a threat to the notion of government of law which is 
every bit as serious as the ‘crime wave’ in our cities” (p. 82). He 
set to work on one of Nixon’s central campaign issues, rolling back 
the Warren Court’s expansion of criminal rights. He prepared a 
lengthy critique of the Warren Court decisions in the area of 
 32. William H. Rehnquist, ‘De Facto’ Schools Seen Serving Well, ARIZONA 
REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 1967, reprinted in 1971 Nomination Hearings, supra note 30, at 309. 
 33. Id.  
 34. See also RICK PERLSTEIN, BEFORE THE STORM: BARRY GOLDWATER AND 
THE UNMAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSENSUS 424-25, 461-62 (2001); TUSHNET, 
supra note 3, at 23-24.  
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criminal justice in which he suggested that rectifying the damage 
the Court had wrought might require a constitutional amendment 
and proposed a presidential commission to consider the 
possibility. A particular target of his attack on the Warren Court 
was Miranda v. Arizona,35 in which the Court required police to 
inform suspects, prior to questioning, about their right to remain 
silent and to counsel. 
With the retirements of Justices Black and Harlan in 1971, 
two new Court openings materialized. One went to Lewis Powell. 
The other, after some debate within the Nixon Administration, 
went to Rehnquist. Nixon and his advisors saw Rehnquist as an 
impressively credentialed lawyer who would please conservative 
elements in the Republican Party. A relative unknown on the 
national legal scene, his confirmation hearings were largely 
uneventful. Controversy arose, however, in the period after the 
hearings had concluded but before his confirmation vote in the 
Senate. This was when Newsweek broke the story of Rehnquist’s 
Brown memorandum.36 Rehnquist’s disingenuous explanation 
that the memos were an effort to capture Justice Jackson’s views, 
not his own, quelled the potential controversy, and the Senate 
approved his nomination with a vote of 70 to 22. On January 7, 
1972, at age forty-seven, Rehnquist took his seat on the Court. 
C. THE COURT YEARS 
At this point, with Rehnquist an Associate Justice on the 
Supreme Court, Jenkins’ biography moves back and forth 
between Rehnquist’s public life as a Justice and his off-the-Court 
interests and activities. The material on his Court work is thin. 
What Jenkins lacks in new insights he fills with a padding of blunt 
and unceasing criticism of Rehnquist’s jurisprudence. 
Jenkins does provide some interesting material, however, 
about Rehnquist’s private life during his Court years. The most 
powerful revelation to emerge from the biography was the extent 
to which Rehnquist chafed against the isolation he felt upon 
landing at the apex of the American legal system. Practically from 
the moment he arrived he was looking for opportunities to shake 
up the staid, formal routines of the Court. Early in his tenure, he 
offered Chief Justice Burger proposals for enlivening the work of 
the Justices (introducing a coffee hour following oral arguments, 
redecorating the dining room, having the clerks put on a satirical 
 35. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 36. Supreme Court: Memo from Rehnquist, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1971, at 32.  
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skit), which Burger promptly shot down (p. 170). Intensely 
competitive, Rehnquist was always trying to set up wagers with 
his colleagues on matters big and small (pp. 171, 197–201). He 
enjoyed playing jokes, some quite elaborate, on his colleagues 
(pp. 171–75). And there were of course those four gold stripes on 
his black robe, which appeared in 1995, inspired by the character 
of the Lord Chancellor in a production of Gilbert and Sullivan’s 
Iolanthe (p. 253). 37 
One fascinating point that comes out quite clearly in this 
behind-the-scenes portrait of Rehnquist was the connection he 
formed with his very senior colleague, William O. Douglas. It 
would be hard to find two Justices who on the surface had less in 
common. Douglas was the New Deal firebrand, the visionary civil 
libertarian, the discoverer of the constitutional right to privacy in 
the penumbras and emanations of the Bill of Rights. Rehnquist 
opposed all of this. Their personal lives were also far, far apart. 
Douglas was the womanizer who married four times, each new 
wife younger than the last. Rehnquist, by all indications, was 
deeply dedicated to Nan until her death in 1991. Douglas was 
notoriously harsh to his clerks, and he had prickly relations with 
his colleagues. Rehnquist was generally beloved by clerks and 
colleagues. Yet the two men, who were on the Court together 
from 1972 until Douglas’ retirement in 1975, shared a roving, 
iconoclastic intellectual brilliance. Rehnquist admired Douglas, 
singling him out for his ability to “[n]ot be[] bamboozled by 
currents, trendy ideas” (p. 151). Douglas respected his younger 
colleague’s intelligence and he urged Rehnquist to cultivate his 
life outside the Court. The ideological odd couple shared time 
with their wives at Douglas’ summer cabin (pp. 152–53). 
Rehnquist followed Douglas’ advice and went searching for 
outside activities—for ways, as Rehnquist put it, to “get away 
from the monasticism” of the Court (p. 154). “You just have to 
keep anchors to the outside world,” Rehnquist explained, 
“because a justice of this Court could do all of the work he has 
to do in discharge of his oath of office without ever leaving this 
building. . . . [I]t’s a two-dimensional world if you let that happen 
to you” (p. 154). He accepted invitations to give speeches and 
talk to law school classes. He took painting classes, read 
 37. According to Justice Stevens, following an international trip in which the Chief 
Justice saw justices from various countries wearing different colored robes, Rehnquist 
suggested to his colleagues a change from their traditional black. There were no takers, 
but Rehnquist went ahead on his own. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME 
COURT MEMOIR 173 (2011).  
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voraciously, and played poker with friends. And he tried his 
hand at writing fiction. 
Jenkins dedicates a chapter to Rehnquist’s failed efforts to 
become a novelist. Rehnquist spent the summer of 1974 writing a 
draft of a short novel, a legal drama centered around a federal 
judge and his clerk. Was the novel any good? Jenkins thinks not. 
“[T]he writing was amateurish, the plot anything but compelling,” 
he declares (p. 181). None of the editors who looked at the 
manuscript felt it publishable without a thorough and 
fundamental reworking (pp. 181–85), so Jenkins’ uncharitable 
assessment appears not far from the mark. Rehnquist, who 
described himself as “a complete neophyte when it comes to 
technique” (p. 181), was an eager student initially. But when yet 
another editor gave Rehnquist detailed editing suggestions, 
making clear the “major effort” that would be required to make 
the novel publishable, Rehnquist became frustrated (p. 184). He 
took a couple more stabs at revising the manuscript in subsequent 
summers, but he never was able to see the project through. He 
lamented to his agent that “somehow the creative urge which 
moved me several summers ago . . . has simply not returned” (p. 
185). He never gave up his goal to become a novelist, though, 
quietly working on other fiction writing projects. The 1990s found 
him working on a murder mystery and musing about possibly 
writing historical fiction about Custer’s Last Stand (pp. 185–87). 
D. REHNQUIST ASSESSED 
What does all this tell us about Rehnquist? Two points are 
worth highlighting. First, Rehnquist formed strikingly clear 
ideological commitments early in life. Although he adapted 
these commitments to new circumstances, his basic beliefs 
changed little over the course of his pre-Court life. These views, 
typical for 1930s Shorewood, Wisconsin, sometimes made for an 
awkward fit during subsequent stages of his life. He felt 
alienated as a graduate student at Harvard, in part because of his 
political views; as a clerk at the Supreme Court he saw himself 
surrounded by left-leaning fellow clerks. The confident young 
lawyer adopted an embattled sensibility, which allowed him to 
only strengthen his conservative and libertarian commitments in 
the following decades, when they seemed increasingly out of step 
with much of the nation. 
Second, Rehnquist, a man of steady temperament and habits 
in so much of his life, was deeply restless when it came to 
occupying his interests. He was constantly searching for new  
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activities and challenges, for new ways to change up stale routines. 
His impatience was evident in both his professional and private 
lives. He made decisions quickly. Never one to agonize, he did not 
second-guess decisions once made.38 As he explained in his one 
interview with Jenkins (in 1984): “You’ve got to . . . decide one 
case and go on to the next one . . . . [T]here’s literally no time for 
thinking about past decisions: Was I right or was I wrong? You’d 
simply go nuts if you did that” (p. 150). (The contrast with the 
notoriously indecisive Justice Harry Blackmun, who served on the 
Court from 1970 and 1994, could not have been starker.39) 
Rehnquist wrote quickly. As Chief Justice, he cut advocates off in 
mid-sentence at oral arguments when their time had expired. 
When the Justices met to discuss recently argued cases, he ran a 
tight, efficient conference, more an opportunity to count votes 
than a discussion session. He generally arrived at the Court mid-
morning and left by mid-afternoon. And, remarkable for a line of 
work prone to proclamations of self-importance, he enjoyed 
deflating the oftentimes over-exuberant rhetoric about the 
Court’s role in American society. It is only a “little stream of 
history that flows by this Court,” he explained in his interview 
with Jenkins. “[M]any other things . . . have a greater influence on 
people’s daily lives than what this Court decides” (p. 149). 
III. A PARTISAN BIOGRAPHY 
In a 1995 article, Judge Posner offered a useful framework 
for evaluating the genre of judicial biography.40 The judicial 
biographer, he explained, tends to be driven by goals that are 
“ideological” and “essentialist”: ideological in that, whether 
seeking to debunk or elevate her subject, the biographer evaluates 
the subject through a comparison to some ideal type;41 essentialist 
in that the biographer seeks to identify within the subject a 
coherent, knowable “essential self.”42 The Partisan fits 
comfortably into Judge Posner’s categorization. Indeed, it reads 
 38. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, How Not to Be Chief Justice: The Apprenticeship of 
William H. Rehnquist, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (2006) (Rehnquist “did not believe in 
second-guessing others or—more importantly—himself. I heard him say in conversation 
more than once that he believed a second or third response to a problem tended to be no 
more valid than the initial response, and so there was little to be gained by going back to 
an issue again and again. He believed in simply getting the job done and moving on.”). 
 39. See generally LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY 
BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY (2005). 
 40. Posner, supra note 4. 
 41. Id. at 503–04. 
 42. Id. at 504.   
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almost like a caricatured effort to demonstrate what a fully 
realized ideological-essentialist judicial biography would look 
like. And, as Judge Posner warned, it is deeply problematic. 
A. THE IDEOLOGICAL REHNQUIST 
One might suspect an ideological agenda on the part of this 
particular biographer even before the book is cracked. The title, 
after all, is The Partisan. Nothing too wrong there, though. 
Rehnquist was an unapologetic conservative throughout his life. 
His pre-Court years were marked by aggressive partisan activity. 
None other than the thoroughly partisan President Richard Nixon 
declared Rehnquist “on our side” (p. 129) and encouraged him to 
“be just as mean and rough as they say you were” (p. xiv) when 
he chose him for the Court. And there is a strong case to be made 
that his judicial decision making was largely an extension of his 
pre-Court partisan commitments. So partisanship might not be 
the worst of themes for his biography. 
We quickly learn, however, that the “partisan” label hardly 
captures the Rehnquist that Jenkins wants to offer. “[T]o call 
Rehnquist simply a conservative,” Jenkins explains at the start of 
the book, “would be to miss the essence of what defined him” (p. 
xiv). From here, Jenkins is off and running, his condemnation of 
his subject gaining momentum with each sentence: 
Rehnquist’s judicial philosophy was nihilistic at its core, 
disrespectful of precedent and dismissive of social, economic, 
and political institutions that did not comport with his black-
and-white view of the world. Rehnquist instinctively knew 
whose side he was on when it came to criminals and law 
abiders, minorities and the white majority, the poor and the 
rich, the powerless and the powerful. He set his plan 
accordingly. Infatuated with his own genius, he spoke his mind, 
cast his votes, and damned his critics (p. xiv). 
B. THE PROBLEM WITH IDEOLOGICAL BIOGRAPHY 
The biographer’s moves on display here are worth stopping 
to consider. Putting aside for the moment Jenkins’ claims about 
Rehnquist’s character—his “essence”—the basic critique here is 
an ideological one: Rehnquist is conservative, and Jenkins does 
not like this. The goal here is to categorize Rehnquist’s political 
beliefs in order to marginalize them. The effect is to distance the 
reader from the subject by establishing an ideological baseline 
(some semi-articulated version of liberalism) and then showing all 
the ways the subject fails to meet its requirements. This is a 
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political critique (or, in Jenkins’ unsubtle hands, more of a 
polemic). It is not biography. 
A biographer’s first responsibility is to understand his 
subject. This requires some level of imagination and empathy—
two qualities in short supply in this particular biography. “Getting 
inside other people’s minds,” writes one historian, “requires that 
your own mind be open to their impressions—their hopes and 
fears, their beliefs and dreams, their sense of right and wrong, 
their perception of the world and where they fit within it.”43 Then, 
and only then, there is the opportunity to judge. A biography 
written without sympathy for the subject is a critical biography. A 
biography written without empathy for the subject is a failure of 
the craft of biography. 
C. THE ESSENTIAL REHNQUIST 
Jenkins’ assessment of Rehnquist goes well beyond a critique 
of his conservative political and jurisprudential beliefs, however. 
According to Jenkins, Rehnquist’s doctrinaire and far-right brand 
of conservatism was more than a failure of political judgment. It 
was a failure at a deeper level, a failure at his subject’s core, inner 
being—his “essence,” in Judge Posner’s formulation. “Like many 
public figures,” Jenkins writes, “Rehnquist presented a face to the 
public that often was at odds with the private man. My purpose 
here is to unmask that private face” (p. xix). The collegial 
Rehnquist was a public “mask of jollity,” behind which was “the 
brooding private man” (p. 34). Since the public Rehnquist was 
defined by a harshness and a lack of charity, so, according to 
Jenkins, must the private Rehnquist be defined by analogously 
ominous characteristics. 
Critically, for Jenkins’ purposes, Rehnquist’s essential self, his 
true self, is at once personal and public. The two are intertwined. The 
key to understanding the public man is to understand the private 
man. As a justice, Rehnquist was a jurisprudential “nihilist,” in that 
he did not respect legal rules and institutions, but the roots of this 
nihilism, according to Jenkins, are found ingrained in his personality. 
He did not care about others—not about what they thought, not 
about their struggles. The personal becomes a window into 
Rehnquist’s essential legal commitments; the legal becomes a 
window into his essential personal commitments. We behold the 
biographer’s creation of a coherent, unitary subject. 
 43. JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE LANDSCAPE OF HISTORY: HOW HISTORIANS MAP 
THE PAST 124 (2002).  
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This essentializing move allows Jenkins to basically read law 
out of his biography. Rehnquist was “an expedient conservative” 
(p. xv). He was “on a partisan’s mission” (p. xv). By defining his 
subject as such a thoroughgoing realist—indeed, a legal 
“nihilist”—Jenkins’ Rehnquist is driven solely by politics, 
ideology, even “instinct” (pp. xiv, xv). The evidence Jenkins 
supplies for this characterization is thin, at best. Rehnquist, in a 
letter to his son, described “stare decisis” in the context of 
constitutional law as “pretty much of a sham” (p. 250). And in an 
interview he described his approach to judging as involving 
looking at both sides of a case and trying to determine which side 
had “the better point of view”—a seemingly innocuous statement 
that Jenkins returns to over and over again as a kind of smoking 
gun of Rehnquist’s lawless, results-oriented decision making 
process (pp. 246, 248, 249). 
By demoting, even dismissing law, and elevating instinctive 
partisanship in its place, Jenkins sets the stage for a judicial 
biography largely void of legal analysis.44 To write a biography 
of a jurist that focuses on issues other than his or her professional 
work product is, of course, perfectly defensible. Such a book 
would be a biography of a judicial figure, if not a judicial 
biography. But The Partisan tries to have it both ways. While de-
emphasizing law and disclaiming to offer any kind of a 
“comprehensive survey of Rehnquist’s jurisprudence” (pp. xix–
xx), Jenkins’ entire book centers on Rehnquist’s life in the law. 
“Rehnquist was a brilliant loner who used the Court to advance 
his right-wing agenda,” Jenkins writes, in what could very well 
serve as the biography’s thesis statement (p. xiv). Although there 
is a good deal of information in this book about Rehnquist’s life 
beyond his opinions, this is hardly a serious study of the private 
man. For behind the public face, what Jenkins purports to 
discover is not a hidden private side, but a somewhat more 
sinister (“brooding”) version of the public face. So the 
Rehnquist everyone knew, i.e., the ideological conservative, was, 
in fact, under the surface, an ideological conservative. The point 
 44. Perhaps the reader should be thankful for this. When Jenkins does touch upon 
matters of legal doctrine, he is prone to errors, some quite glaring. For instance, he 
describes Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2000), an Establishment Clause case, as the case 
that signaled the demise of the “federalism revolution” (p. 249). He also mangles an effort 
to describe the influence of Charles Fairman, Rehnquist’s professor at Stanford. He 
somehow links Fairman’s views on the Fourteenth Amendment’s “incorporation” of the 
Bill of Rights to (a) Rehnquist’s opposition to Brown; (b) his dissent in Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973); and (c) his majority opinion in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000) (pp. 16, 37, 143).   
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in this unenlightening exercise is to do more than to illuminate 
the private Rehnquist. It is to illuminate the real, true, and 
essential Rehnquist, a coherent being whose public and private 
life was of a piece. In the end, this book seeks to demonstrate 
how Rehnquist used the law and the highest legal institution in 
the land to advance his agenda, but to do so without seriously 
engaging with the law. This is an enterprise destined, on its own 
terms, to come up short. 
Jenkins has still another simplifying move to make. Not only 
does he write law out of Rehnquist’s story, but he also defines 
his subject as basically unchanging in his basic views. In Jenkins’ 
telling, the reactionary’s ideas were etched in stone from the 
beginning. His upbringing in a comfortable Republican 
household in a suburb of Milwaukee (“a homogenous idyll of 
lakefront mansions and well-tended bungalows” (p. xviii)) made 
him a right-wing ideologue; his life thereafter was just a matter 
of locating ways to express his beliefs. His three-plus decades on 
the Supreme Court were exceptional in that he changed not a 
whit. Rehnquist offers “a unique case study,” Jenkins explains, 
in that he was “flash frozen from the day he arrived” on the 
Court (p. xvii). 
D. THE PROBLEM WITH ESSENTIALIZING 
The basic problem with all this essentializing, all this 
“unmasking,” is that it is so out of line with some basic facts about 
Rehnquist. In this section I consider two facets of Rehnquist’s life 
that have puzzled observers, but that Jenkins’ biography does 
nothing to illuminate. Indeed, he basically denies they are issues 
at all. They are: (1) Rehnquist’s close personal relations with his 
colleagues; and (2) his apparent shift of position toward the end 
of his life on several major constitutional questions. 
1. Personality 
It is difficult to square Jenkins’ harsh assessment of Rehnquist the 
man with his record of close friendships with his fellow Justices. As 
David Garrow wrote in a 1996 profile, “his colleagues were 
unanimously pleased and supportive” when Rehnquist was being 
considered for the Chief Justiceship. A lawyer who interviewed 
people in the Court found the prospect of Rehnquist’s elevation was 
met with “genuine enthusiasm on the part of not only his colleagues 
on the Court but others who served the Court in a staff capacity and 
some of the relatively lowly paid individuals at the Court. There was 
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almost a unanimous feeling of joy.”45 Even his ideological opponents 
seemed to like him on an personal level. According to Garrow, Justice 
William J. Brennan once privately described Rehnquist as “my best 
friend up here.”46 Jenkins gives the reader no insight into why so many 
people—including those who passionately disagreed with Rehnquist’s 
legal and political commitments—liked the man. The best he can do 
is to suggest that Rehnquist was a great dissembler—a fake, basically. 
(“But behind the façade lurked a different person” (p. 163).) 
Jenkins’ portrait of Rehnquist as harsh and unyielding in all walks 
of life simply does not add up. His colleagues consistently praised his 
leadership skills. Unlike his predecessor, Chief Justice Warren Burger, 
who was notorious both for his officiousness and the rambling Justices’ 
conferences he led, Rehnquist stood out for, in Justice Stevens’ 
assessment, his ability to handle the responsibilities of the Chief 
Justice “competently and impartially.”47 On the part of his law clerks, 
Rehnquist evoked a sense of real affection.48 
Rehnquist could be quite compassionate to those around 
him. He had an irreverent sense of humor, a low-key demeanor, 
and, for all the confidence with which he espoused his views, a 
personal self-deprecation rare for someone with his 
achievements. To be sure, he could be harsh and uncompromising; 
his humor often struck a juvenile chord and it could be callous; 
and much of his political work prior to becoming a judge and a 
good deal of his work on the bench evidences a shortage of basic 
sensitivity for the condition of the disempowered and 
downtrodden in society. But Jenkins never makes anything close 
to a persuasive case for why his less admirable qualities should be 
understood as the truth of the man, while everything else nothing 
more than a cynical “mask.” People are contradictory and 
complicated. A better biographer would have recognized the 
contradictions and complications of Rehnquist’s life story as an 
opportunity. 
2. Change 
Another significant aspect of Rehnquist’s biography that 
Jenkins fails to confront is the apparent shift, toward the end 
 45. David J. Garrow, The Rehnquist Reins, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 6, 1996, at 67. 
 46. Id. 
 47. STEVENS, supra note 37, at 170. 
 48. See, e.g., the Maureen Mahoney interview in THE SUPREME COURT: A C-
SPAN BOOK FEATURING THE JUSTICES IN THEIR OWN WORDS 288-89 (Brian Lamb 
et al. eds., 2010); James E. Ryan, The Chief as Teacher, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1687 (2006).  
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of his time on the Court, in his positions on certain 
constitutional issues. If the central theme of Rehnquist’s tenure 
as an Associate Justice (1972-86) was his robust, often lonely 
conservatism (his clerks nicknamed him the “Lone Ranger” for 
his frequent solo dissents), the central theme of his tenure as 
Chief Justice (1986-2005) was something else. There was no 
transformation, to be sure, but there were signs of evolution, a 
new sensibility about his role on the Court that had something 
to do with his position as Chief Justice and something to do 
with his own reconsideration of the merits of certain 
constitutional positions he had previously staked out. 
Rehnquist’s sense of institutional responsibility to the Court 
became more evident. He showed less interest in expounding 
and defending his conservative jurisprudence. His written 
opinions, never particularly discursive, turned terse and 
workmanlike—”dry and to the point,” as one journalist put it.49 
And, contrary to Jenkins’ relentless “partisan” thesis, 
Rehnquist did appear to moderate, to some extent, from the 
unyielding conservative jurisprudence that had defined his 
public life to that point. 
What happened? Jenkins offers little guidance here because 
he basically tries to deny that anything happened at all. In some 
instances he does this by just ignoring decisions that fail to 
conform to his portrait of Rehnquist. Thus the landmark 1996 sex 
discrimination case involving the Virginia Military Institute50 gets 
nary a mention, even though Rehnquist, a longtime critic of the 
Court’s sex discrimination doctrine,51 joined the majority in this 
one52 (while his usual ally, Justice Scalia, wrote one of his 
trademark scorched-earth dissents53). 
In other instances, Jenkins makes cursory efforts to explain 
away decisions that do not fit his “flash frozen” Rehnquist. 
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs (2003)54 was a 
6-3 decision in which Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the Court, 
 49. Garrow, supra note 45, at 70. 
 50. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 51. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217-28 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see generally 
Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy 
Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1874-81 (2006) (describing Rehnquist’s 
opposition to the ERA prior to appointment to the Court and resistance to heightened 
scrutiny for sex discrimination once on the Court). 
 52. 518 U.S. at 558–66 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
 53. Id. at 566-603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 54. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).  
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upholding congressional power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to require state governments to apply the Family 
and Medical Leave Act to its employees. Rehnquist’s decision has 
been something of a puzzler for scholars. Reva Siegel wrote an 
article on Rehnquist and Hibbs titled You’ve Come a Long Way, 
Baby.55 The favored explanation for this surprising development 
attributes Rehnquist’s evolution on the issue of pregnancy 
discrimination to his personal life. Following his wife’s death in 
1991, he took on more grandparenting responsibility, including 
helping to take care of the child of one of his daughters, a single 
mom working as a lawyer. Rehnquist’s opinion in Hibbs was 
“such a delightful surprise,” recalled Justice Ginsburg.56 
When my husband read it, he asked, did I write that opinion? I 
was very fond of my old chief. I have a sense that it was in part 
his life experience. When his daughter Janet was divorced, I 
think the chief felt some kind of responsibility to be kind of a 
father figure to those girls. So he became more sensitive to 
things that he might not have noticed.57 
In order to explain Hibbs, Jenkins offers a new twist in his 
assessment of Rehnquist—a twist that has the inconvenience of 
undermining the central thesis of his biography. Rehnquist, the 
unwavering conservative ideologue, the reactionary, is actually, 
Jenkins claims in the closing pages of the book, an adherent of 
“pragmatic conservatism” (p. 246). Because he doesn’t care about 
law, but because he does care about his daughter, who is a single 
mother, the decision is perfectly explainable. 
But wait—Hibbs, we now learn, “wasn’t the only time that 
Rehnquist confounded the conservative pundits” (p. 246). (The 
predictable ideologue has suddenly become much more 
interesting.) There was also the 2000 case58 in which Rehnquist, a 
long-time critic of Miranda v. Arizona,59 wrote an opinion which 
declared that the Miranda warnings “have become part of our 
national culture,”60 and struck down a 1968 federal law in which 
Congress had sought to statutorily overturn the controversial 1966 
decision. 
 55. Siegel, supra note 51. 
 56. Emily Bazelon, The Place of Women on the Court, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 
12, 2009, at 46. 
 57. Id.; see also Cary Franklin, Justice Ginsburg’s Advocacy and the Future of Equal 
Protection, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 227, 233 (2013), http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/02/21/
franklin.html (remarks of Justice Ginsburg). 
 58. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 59. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
 60. 530 U.S. at 443.  
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What happened here? Jenkins does not really have an 
explanation. Rehnquist was a “situationalist” (p. 246), meaning 
that he was moved by instinct, and here his gut steered him to 
change course. Others have provided more useful efforts at 
explanation. Justice Scalia assumed, plausibly, it has something to 
do with the institutional responsibilities of the Chief Justiceship. 
As an Associate Justice, Rehnquist “was a shin kicker. He was 
very, very opinionated. He changed when he became chief.”61 
Additional evidence might be drawn from Rehnquist’s own 
extrajudicial writings, which were quite extensive and, prior to his 
elevation to Chief Justice, often quite probing and self-reflective 
on the role of the judge in a constitutional democracy. A 
particularly notable theme in the various lectures he delivered in 
the 1970s and 1980s was the impact of public opinion on the 
Supreme Court—a fact he saw as both inevitable and, to an 
extent, desirable.62 
Although there is much room for debate regarding the nature 
and extent of Rehnquist’s change, that something happened here 
is indisputable. Regardless of how one characterizes these cases, 
they raise one of the great questions about Rehnquist the man and 
the jurist—a question that screams out for some sort of insight by 
a biographer. Jenkins does not even go so far as to identify this as 
a question. The Rehnquist he has created for the reader could not 
change, therefore he did not change, therefore there is no puzzle 
to be explored. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
At the heart of the challenge of writing any biography is the 
need to create a coherent, unitary whole out of a subject’s life, 
uniting the personal with the public. The standard contribution of 
the judicial biographer is to probe behind the official 
pronouncements of the subject, unearthing their deeper meaning 
by linking jurisprudence with personality and character. A 
Justice’s written opinions are transformed into a reflection of 
something deeper. They become lenses into an inner self. This 
 61. Quoted in Terry Baynes, Fanning furor, Justice Scalia says appeals court judge 
lied, REUTERS, Sept. 17, 2012. Prior to his elevation, Rehnquist wrote that the Chief Justice 
“must be not only a jurist, but interlocutor of the judicial minstrel show, a planner, and 
occasionally a statesman. Surely training in the rough and tumble of politics is no hindrance 
to the performance of these tasks.” William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justices I Never Knew, 3 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 637, 639 (1976). 
 62. See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, Presidential Appointments to the Supreme Court, 
2 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 320 (1985); Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 697.  
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kind of scholarship can be illuminating. But it is also fraught with 
risks—as demonstrated in Jenkins’ relentless, ultimately 
flattening effort to “unmask” Chief Justice Rehnquist. 
Jenkins writes that “Rehnquist often appeared to be living in 
a private world of his own invention” (p. xvi). Perhaps. Perhaps 
this might be said of us all. What is unquestionable, though, is that 
the Rehnquist of this partisan biography is one largely of the 
author’s own creation. He is not a fair representation of what we 
know about Rehnquist simply by virtue of his public record. He is 
not even an interesting or fully realized character—he fails as a 
product of biographical reconstruction. He is the unfortunate 
projection of a writer who disagrees with his subject’s legal and 
political views and who also took a visceral disliking to his subject 
on a personal level. 
The Partisan is a failure as a work of biography. But it fails in 
some rather interesting ways. The book raises, if often 
inadvertently, important questions about Rehnquist and his 
legacy, as well as the general challenge of writing a biography of 
a modern Supreme Court Justice. 
 
